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Through interviews and courtroom observations in a case study done in 
collaboration with a community partner in two judicial districts in Minnesota, 
the authors extend the scholarly conversation about critical, activist research 
in business and technical communication and make pedagogical suggestions 
by studying two groups who contribute to the discourse about victim rights: 
judges who accept plea negotiations and make sentencing decisions and 
advocates who help victims contribute, through victim impact statements, 
their reactions as crime victims and their requests for certain punishments 
and conditions for the crime perpetrators. The authors identify the technolo­
gies of power used by each group to assert their disciplinary authority and 
trace how these assertions play out in the courtroom. They conclude that by 
capitalizing on the normative structures of impact statements, advocates may 
actually give victims more power. Such activist research might benefit 
research participants and enhance research methods. 
Of the various groups that claim agency in shaping communication in the public arena, those that write and interpret the law and those that advocate 
for people affected by those laws must negotiate sometimes differing voices 
and goals. In this article, we focus on two such groups that contribute to the 
discourse about victim rights: judges who accept plea negotiations and make 
sentencing decisions and advocates who help victims contribute—through vic­
tim impact statements (VISs)—their reactions as crime victims and their 
requests for certain punishments and conditions for crime perpetrators. We 
identify the technologies of power used by each group to assert disciplinary 
authority and trace how these assertions play out in the courtroom. We conclude 
that judges who are granted primary power in the discipline of law exercise a 
legal choice to support, weigh, or restrict impact statements in the various cases 
they handle. In addition, judges have in mind an informal, but established, norm 
that helps determine whether an impact statement is persuasive as they decide 
whether to accept a plea negotiation or which sentence to impose. Victim advo­
cates, in turn, acknowledge and understand this norm, and they help victims 
write VISs that will fit within the norm and, therefore, have a greater chance of 
being persuasive to the court. Further, we suggest that by capitalizing on these 
normative structures, victim advocates may actually deviate from those norms 
to give themselves, and subsequently victims, more power. 
We also situate our study within the growing body of scholarly work that 
seeks to contribute to the public sphere and comment on how that goal 
might affect the research methods used in such studies. We feel that such 
research and classroom experiences in the public arena are essential in busi­
ness and technical communication programs, particularly to help graduate 
students identify and understand the technologies of power used by creators 
and interpreters of public policy. The case study we present here is an 
example of such experiences. 
In our study of VISs then, we asked the following questions: (a) Given 
the legislated right that victims have to give impact statements, how do the 
concerned groups interpret that right in the sentencing hearing? (b) What 
values, goals, and technologies of power appear in the interpretations of 
those rights? (c) How do these perhaps conflicting interpretations, values, 
goals, and technologies of power reflect the disciplinary power of each 
group and influence the application of the policy that enables victims to 
give impact statements? (d) What does a study of such statements con­
tribute to our field, particularly in terms of education and research goals in 
the public arena, and to the participants in such studies?1 
Data Collection, Organization of the Study, 
and Community Partnership 
To answer these questions, we designed a qualitative case study and con­
ducted 45-minute face-to-face interviews with 28 judges in the Fourth and 
Second Judicial Districts in Minnesota (Hennepin County–Minneapolis and 
Ramsey County–St. Paul, respectively) between November 2004 and May 
2006. At the same time, we conducted similar interviews with 17 community 
and system victim and witness advocates in both districts. In our sample, 
60% of the judges were male and 40% were female; 89% were Caucasian, 
7% were African American, and 4% were Hispanic; 43% had 5 to 10 years’ 
experience on the bench, 25% had 11 to 20 years’ experience, and 32% had 
more than 20 years’ experience; and 66% were assigned to criminal and civil 
cases, 17% to juvenile cases, 7% to civil cases, 3% to family cases, and 7% 
served as chief judges. The advocates we interviewed were all female although 
we did include one male probation officer in Hennepin County who 
specialized in domestic violence and sexual assault cases; two advocates 
were African American, and the rest were Caucasian. Their experience 
ranged from 1 year to over 20 years on the job. Immediately after the inter­
views, we transcribed them verbatim, and we each coded the transcriptions 
and then compared and refined our results (see Appendix A for our inter­
view questions). During the same time, we also attended 17 sentencing 
hearings in a variety of cases in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties to under­
stand the courtroom dynamics when an impact statement is offered, and 
although in this article we focus on the interviews, we allude to the hear­
ings observed when they offer insight into statements gleaned from the 
interviews. During our interviews with the advocates, we established an 
agreement that they would alert us whenever an impact statement was 
going to be delivered in a sentence hearing. We attended the first four hear­
ings together to develop and refine an observation form (see Appendix B) 
and to standardize our responses, and then we divided up the observations. 
Our research partner for this project was WATCH (originally called 
Women at the Court House but now legally known by the acronym), a local 
volunteer-based court monitoring and research organization that follows 
family and sexual violence cases and provides feedback to the justice system. 
WATCH provided a way for us to observe and learn about the often unseen 
and subtle negotiations in the public arena. We suggested the project, and 
WATCH endorsed it as part of its courtroom research initiative. Our affiliation 
with WATCH opened many doors for us, particularly among the judges. For 
example, judges in the Fourth District where WATCH operates were accustomed 
to a public presence in their courtrooms, and over a third of them were willing 
to agree to interviews regardless of their relationship with WATCH. One 
judge, for example, said that she would do “anything for WATCH” (4JD6) 
whereas another agreed to an interview even though he felt misunderstood 
when WATCH commented on a case he had handled.2 Although WATCH 
volunteers primarily monitor domestic violence and sexual assault cases, 
our observations and interviews also included discourse surrounding other 
person crimes such as driving while intoxicated (DWI), identity theft, and 
homicide. WATCH had a definite goal in mind: to create a conversation 
between judges and between judges and advocates in order to share impres­
sions and reflections about how to handle impact statements and to expose 
any attitudes that either served or silenced victims. 
Because we knew that WATCH would publish our findings in an exten­
sive report that included its own volunteers’ observations of more than 70 
sentencing hearings, we designed our interview questions and observation 
form to solicit primarily perceptions and stories that revealed judicial atti­
tudes and advocate perceptions.3 In our judicial interviews, we focused on 
sentencing decisions that the judge made (as opposed to capital cases in 
which a jury would make such decisions) and on plea negotiations that the 
judge would either accept, modify, or reject. We found the open-ended 
questions at the end of our interviews most revealing: For example, although 
all the judges remarked that sentencing guidelines were more important 
than impact statements in making a sentencing decision or accepting a plea 
negotiation, they all were able to recall an impact statement that did affect 
a decision. From the judges’ and advocates’ descriptions of the statements, 
gathered from our interviews, and our courtroom observations of judges’ 
integration of parts of impact statements when handing down sentences, we 
were able to speculate about the persuasive features of such statements. 
Once we finished our project, WATCH posted our report on its Web site 
(http://www.watchmn.org/court.html), and parts of the report were also 
covered by several local electronic and print media in the Twin Cities. Finally, 
we knew that our research had some impact when judges and advocates told 
WATCH that they had read it and expressed interest and curiosity in, and 
sometimes dismay at, each other’s statements. Our report listed several 
recommendations for improving judges’ and victims’ experiences with 
impact statements in sentencing hearings. For example, we recommended 
that “victim impact statements should be submitted well in advance of the 
sentencing hearing to give judges time to read and respond to them” (p. 23) 
and that 
judges should remember to thank the victim for coming forward, and, if they 
are comfortable, to compliment the victim on her courage in doing so. Given 
how healing and empowering this might be for the victim, judges should also 
consider mentioning the impact statement and any specifics from that state­
ment when handing down the sentence. (p. 24) 
  
Although we considered ourselves researchers in conducting this study, 
WATCH’s advocacy goal influenced the version of the report we presented to 
it and we were excited about making positive changes in the courtroom. 
That is, understanding WATCH as an advocacy group moved us to think in 
terms of further promoting those goals and, in doing so, to step outside the 
academic world with which we were most familiar—one that can often be 
rather insular. Although working with WATCH was gratifying in itself, one of 
the most rewarding aspects of our research came from sharing the results of 
our project with this organization. Our understanding of the VIS, based on 
and coupled with what we learned from our research, interviews, and obser­
vations, was viewed by WATCH as pertinent to its own mission and the 
issues its volunteers encounter in their work on a daily basis. In short, working 
with WATCH served as a reminder that merging advocacy work with academic 
work is indeed possible and that academic work can have a positive influence 
both within and outside the academy. In fact, thinking of academic work in 
terms of its capacity to do advocacy work, and wanting to share that perspec­
tive with colleagues and students alike, is what fuels much of our energy for 
research and teaching. Nonetheless, we encountered challenges in working 
with a community partner such as WATCH. These challenges centered 
primarily on the need to maintain carefully established relationships within 
the legal and advocacy communities. In conducting the judicial and advocate 
interviews, for example, we needed to maintain the respectful relationships that 
WATCH had developed. We ensured confidentiality and tried to provide 
some outcomes from our study that might be useful to those parties involved 
with it. But, overall, the greatest benefit of this study gave us our greatest 
challenge in conducting it: We were doing academic work that became 
advocacy work, so we had to balance our interests with those of our research 
partner in improving the system while describing the nature of that system. 
In presenting our study here, we first capture the context of the study, 
aligning it with other critical activist research in business and technical 
communication and review the legislated statutes and sentencing guidelines 
that are interpreted in the courtroom, placing them within the historical 
context of the victim rights movement from which WATCH’s work origi­
nates. Next, we describe the theoretical framework for the study, based on 
Foucault’s (1979) theories of disciplinary authority and technologies of 
power and De Certeau’s (1984) understanding of strategies and tactics, both of 
which guided our interpretation of the courtroom discourse about VISs. Last, 
we examine the data from our interviews and observations to capture the tech­
nologies of power in the judiciary and advocate realms through that courtroom 
discourse. We conclude by speculating what this study can contribute to our 
understanding and pedagogical goals of research on public policy and the 
public arena. 
The Scholarly, Legal, and Public
 
Policy Context of the Study
 
In writing this article, we are very keen on sharing with colleagues and 
graduate students the idea that academic work can indeed be understood as 
advocacy work and that academic work can have an impact not only within 
but also outside the academy. Recent scholarship in business and technical 
communication has demonstrated the ways in which researchers may use 
field-based methods such as interviewing or participant observation to 
better understand the discourse practices of particular communities or 
organizations and subsequently to influence more reflective discursive 
practices within those settings. Faber (1998), for example, interested in 
better understanding the factors underpinning organizational change, 
viewed organizations as inherently “discursive products” and identified 
five rhetorical factors that constitute a “discursive model of change” (p. 219). 
This model can subsequently be of use to “distressed organizations” 
undergoing downsizing or implementing hierarchical changes, as well as 
to organizations wishing to implement organizational changes related to 
identity construction (p. 233). Implicit in Faber’s study is the idea that 
business and technical communication researchers can play an integral 
role in partnering with organizations to help influence internal decision 
making. Researchers who partner with organizations for particular pur­
poses can offer contextualized understandings of local discursive prac­
tices, and they can describe the ways in which certain rhetorical strategies 
may contribute to those practices in order to influence or shed light on pol­
icy changes. In this sense, the business and technical communication 
researcher becomes engaged in critical advocacy-based research that seeks 
to influence or inform policy change. 
In “Saving the Great Lakes: Public Participation in Environmental Policy,” 
Waddell (1996) was also concerned with site-based research that aims to set 
out a model for “enhancing public participation in environmental and science 
policy disputes” (p. 158). Although Waddell’s study predates Faber’s (1998), 
and the subject matter differs greatly, Waddell may be understood as implicitly 
arguing for an activist research program in which the public communicates 
with policy makers to participate in local decision making. In what some 
consider a landmark essay in environmental rhetoric, Waddell examined the 
influence of “public testimony at the [1991] International Joint Commission’s 
Sixth Biennial Meeting on Great Lakes Water Quality” (p. 144). Waddell 
concluded by advocating for a social constructionist model of policy making 
in which “risk communication is not a process whereby values, beliefs, and 
emotions are communicated only from the public and technical information is 
communicated only from the technical experts” (p. 142) but that necessarily 
entails the sharing of information and involves open communication between 
all participants. 
Also serving to bridge the communication gap between experts and lay 
audiences, Barton’s (2004) research on the discourse practices of medical 
oncologists in discussing prognosis with their patients helps identify “prog­
nosis as a problem in the discourse of medicine” (p. 96). That is, her 
research suggests that medical oncologists tend to avoid or background the 
difficult discussion of prognosis by “shifting the communicative responsi­
bility for prognosis to patients and their families” (p. 106). Not only did 
Barton ground her research in observational fieldwork, but equally impor­
tant, she also presented the results of her work to “medical practitioners in 
an effort to establish a mutual understanding of professional practices and, 
perhaps, move toward critically informed changes in those practices.” In 
doing so, she suggested, “our critical engagement will not only be richer 
but also be more likely to ring true to the audience of the discipline as a 
basis for change” (p. 106). 
In a somewhat related study, Schuster (2006) interviewed clients of a 
freestanding birth center operated by a local direct-entry midwife, who pro­
vides a space and shares a discourse that helps those clients resist the hege­
monic medical messages about the risks involved in birth outside the 
hospital. Schuster’s interviews reveal the strategies that such clients use in 
choosing the space in which they give birth and in managing pain without 
drugs or medical intervention. Both Barton (2004) and Schuster expressed 
an idea that we too wish to emphasize here, one that we see as an impor­
tant contribution to activist research in business and technical communica­
tion—that sharing the results of field-based research with research partners 
and participants may help not only to bridge the gap between the researcher 
and the “audience of the discipline” but also to initiate changes in the 
practices under discussion. Thus, sharing research results with participants 
is a valuable component of activist research in business and technical 
communication. 
Grabill (2000), in his work with the Atlanta Planning Council and their 
local processes around HIV–AIDS policy making, explicitly positioned the 
technical writing researcher as activist. Grabill understood “policy making as 
a function of institutionalized rhetorical processes” and took “an activist 
research stance in order to help generate the knowledge necessary to intervene 
in those processes” (p. 31). Grabill argued that activist research should afford 
“power and position to others in order to achieve a goal,” that “participants 
must benefit from the processes of research just as the researcher benefits,” and 
that “outsiders [should] be invited to participate in local problem solving.” 
Last, Grabill maintained that activist research must involve “mutual knowledge 
construction . . . that participants have a fundamental opportunity to participate 
in analysis, reflection, and meaning making” (p. 34). In our own work with 
WATCH, we also strongly believed that the organization should benefit from 
our research process, and we assisted it in refining the project and com­
pleting a plan to disseminate its results. 
To understand further the goals of WATCH and this study, we must rec­
ognize the context of the victim rights movement and of legal and public 
policy debate concerning VISs. The legislated right to give impact state­
ments originated within the victim rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s 
in the United States. This movement generated efforts such as rape crisis 
centers, victim and witness advocacy programs, hotlines and shelters for 
battered women, victim compensation programs, mandatory arrest policies 
in domestic violence cases, restitution programs, stalking statutes, commu­
nity notification laws, the online national sex offender registry, and amber 
alerts. Other governmental and grassroots efforts and organizations within 
the movement include the National Organization for Victim Assistance 
(founded in 1975); the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault (1978); 
the Crime Victims’ Legal Advocacy Institute (1979), renamed the Victims’ 
Assistance Legal Organization (VALOR) in 1981; Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving (1980); state-sponsored Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights (the first was 
passed by Wisconsin in 1980); Crime Victims’ Rights Week, created by 
President Reagan in 1981, and the Task Force on Victims of Crime that fol­
lowed in 1982; the U.S. Department of Justice Office for Victims of Crime 
(1983); the National Center for Victims of Crime (1985), which works with 
over 10,000 grassroots organizations and criminal justice agencies; the 
National Aging Resource Center on Elder Abuse (1988); and the Violence 
Against Women Act, which authorized, in 1994, more than one billion dol­
lars for funding programs to combat violence against women and then, in 
2000, extensive funding for rape prevention and education programs. 
WATCH, founded in 1992, responded to a perceived need of victims to 
have a public presence in the courtroom. In part, however, all these efforts 
were meant to ensure that victims had a voice in criminal proceedings 
against their abusers. 
 The right to give an impact statement is legislated in a Minnesota statute 
(Right to Submit Statement at Sentencing, 2006). Impact statements have a 
number of purposes: to increase victim satisfaction and closure, to educate 
the court on the burden crime places on the victim, to allow the victim to 
react to the proposed sentence, to better determine restitution orders, and to 
balance the information the court receives on the defendant’s background 
(Sobieski, 2004, para. 6). Community advocates in the Twin Cities, such as the 
Tubman Family Alliance Center and Casa de Esperanza, provide shelter, as 
well as help in negotiating the legal process, particularly for orders of pro­
tection for domestic violence victims. Other community groups such as the 
Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women and Battered Women’s Legal 
Advocacy Group focus on education and system change. System advocates, 
such as those affiliated with the County Attorney Offices in the Fourth and 
Second Judicial Districts in Minnesota, help victims of a variety of person 
crimes—anything from identity theft to homicide—negotiate the legal system 
and provide templates and models of VISs. Both community and system 
advocates accompany victims to sentencing hearings and will read, edit, 
and even, if the victim prefers, deliver the impact statement orally during 
the hearing. 
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have affirmed the right to give an impact 
statement (see Payne v. Tennessee, 1991). Despite this decision, whether 
impact statements are prejudicial and inflammatory in all cases, and therefore 
a violation of a defendant’s eighth amendment rights, is still debated by schol­
ars (see e.g., Arrigo & Williams, 2003; Bandes, 1996; Burr, 2002-2003; 
Schneider, 1992). Other scholars have asked whether victims do feel better 
after giving an impact statement, and their findings vary from victims get­
ting little satisfaction (see e.g., Bandes, 2000; Hillenbrand & Smith, 1989; 
Karmen, 1992) to victims experiencing great satisfaction if the judge 
acknowledges and even responds to the statement by citing the victim’s 
own words in rendering the sentence (see e.g., Erez, 1991; Erez, 1999; 
Villmoare & Neto, 1987). 
Similar studies ask whether impact statements have an effect on sentencing 
decisions. Greene (1999), for example, found that information about the 
personal qualities of the deceased created “a more favorable impression” of 
the victim than that created by opinion evidence alone or no victim impact 
information (p. 344; see also Greene & Koehring, 1998; Nadler & Rose, 
2003). Ludwig (2001), on the other hand, found that impact statements 
did not have a significant effect on decisions to depart from the presumed 
sentence, to sentence according to aggravated or mitigated guidelines, or to 
issue restitution orders (p. ii; see also Erez & Laster, 1999; Erez & Tontodonato, 
1990; Henley, Davis, & Smith, 1994; Jackson, 1994; Myers & Arbuthnot, 
1999). Moreover, Sanders, Hoyle, Morgan, and Cape (2001) explained that 
impact statements have little effect because most cases are “typical cases,” 
that is, “the impact of the crime on the victim is as one would expect given 
the nature and seriousness of the crime,” and any significant harm will be 
revealed before the sentencing hearing, in the form of witness statements, 
for example (p. 454). The scholarly debate continues over the challenge 
VISs might pose to constitutional rights, the satisfaction that victims feel 
when giving a VIS, and the effect such VISs might have on sentencing 
decisions and plea negotiations. 
Finally, Minnesota is one of many states that have adopted sentencing 
guidelines for felony convictions.4 Particularly important to our study is the 
potential tension between the presumed sentencing guidelines and the leg­
islated right to give an impact statement in cases in which the victim wants 
to influence the sentence. According to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission (2006), the purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to “establish 
rational and consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing 
disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are pro­
portional to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the 
offender’s criminal history.” The sentencing guidelines take into account 
two dimensions, offense severity and criminal history, and departures from 
the presumptive sentences “should be made only when substantial and 
compelling circumstances exist” (p. 2). Recently judges’ options were fur­
ther limited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington (2004). In 
states with sentencing guidelines, a jury must now determine beyond a rea­
sonable doubt whether aggravating factors, other than prior convictions, 
exist as facts before a judge may use these factors to impose a harsher sen­
tence than indicated in the sentencing guidelines, or the defendant must 
waive his “Blakely rights” in a plea negotiation that includes a harsher sen­
tence. Therefore, although victims have the right to give an impact state­
ment, they enter into a legal system that is still negotiating how to respond 
to these often-emotional statements that may disrupt a system supposedly 
based on rationality and neutrality. 
Theoretical Framework 
In this study, we relied on Foucault’s (1990) theories of power and 
knowledge systems and his definitions of technologies of power, as well as 
  
on De Certeau’s (1984) notion of strategies and tactics, to understand the 
disciplinary authority and interactions of judges and advocates who 
respond when victims choose to give impact statements. To Foucault, law 
is only “the terminal point” that those in power might take; instead, he pro­
posed that to understand the nuances of power relations, we must identify 
“the multiplicity of force relations immanent in their sphere in which they 
operate and which constitute their own organization” (p. 92). In other 
words, we might do well to consider the dynamics that function to perpet­
uate and sustain what counts as a normal, and thereby acceptable and per­
suasive, VIS. That is, the normative structures governing what counts as an 
acceptable impact statement do not come from nowhere. They are a prod­
uct of, for one, judges’ attempts to reconcile their own disciplinary author­
ity and adherence to state guidelines with victims’ requests for particular 
sentences or punishments for defendants’ crimes. Victim advocates func­
tion as intermediaries who not only work within the system but also help 
victims articulate the effects of a crime in an attempt to influence the sen­
tence, feel empowered and heard, and, ultimately, heal. These complex 
relationships are not always stable and are thus subject to “ceaseless strug­
gles and confrontations,” forms of resistance that are never external to 
power but instead part of the “interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile rela­
tions” (pp. 92, 95). To say that these relationships are “nonegalitarian,” how­
ever, is not necessarily to say that they are adversarial—they may or may not be. 
What they are, though, is negotiable. And we are interested in the many 
points of negotiation in those relationships. 
De Certeau (1984) also addressed the ways in which particular groups 
negotiate, through the conscious or unconscious implementation of strategies 
and tactics, a balance of power. For example, judges’ adherence to state 
guidelines, or even the existence of such guidelines in the first place, may be 
understood as consistent with De Certeau’s notion of the “strategy.” Judges’ 
negotiations of these guidelines with the needs and requests of victims then 
work as a 
calculation of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject 
with will and power [such as the courts] can be isolated . . . [and] delimited 
as its own and . . . serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority 
composed of targets or threats . . . can be managed. (p. 36) 
An “exteriority” is not necessarily a “target” or a “threat” per se; rather, an 
exteriority is an organization that works both with and against the more 
powerful subject, in this case, the court system. An exterior group, such as 
the victim advocates, for example, might then execute what De Certeau 
referred to as “tactics,” or 
calculated action[s] determined by the absence of a proper locus. No delim­
itation of an exteriority, then, provides it with the condition necessary for 
autonomy. The space of the tactic is the space of the other. Thus it must play 
on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign 
power. (p. 37) 
In other words, victim advocates must work within the terrain of the court sys­
tem, recognizing the sentencing guidelines and VIS norms established by 
judges. Furthermore, victim advocates occupy the space of the other by using 
those norms to inform their own advocacy work and thus empower the victim. 
Foucault (1990) also understood normalization as a necessary compo­
nent for maintaining, resisting, and negotiating disciplinary power. He 
explored the tension between, on one hand, “the rule of optimal specifica­
tion”—or the legal impulse to rely on “an exhaustive, explicit code” of 
“defining crimes and fixing penalties,” such as Minnesota’s sentencing 
guidelines—and, on the other hand, individualization that responds to such 
things as the “status of the offender” (pp. 98, 99). Rather than applying such 
impulses to punish to theories of the law or moral choices, or the institu­
tions based on these theories or choices, Foucault (1979) recommended 
analyzing the “modalities according to which the power to punish is exer­
cised,” that is, the “technologies of power” (p. 131). Foucault proposed that 
such punishment depends on normalization. So in this study, we must reach 
below the surface of the sentencing guidelines and legislation to understand 
the relationship between the judges who must weigh the VISs and the advo­
cates who help prepare them. In rhetorical terms, what is determined to be 
normal is persuasive; what is considered to be abnormal is not. More 
specifically, in hearing VISs, judges establish, wittingly or unwittingly, a 
norm for what counts as the acceptable, thereby persuasive, impact state­
ment. Advocates recognize the acceptance of these norms and work within 
them, sometimes subtly subverting the disciplinary mechanisms of the court 
system in order to help victims compose what they know will be the most 
well-received impact statement possible, thus helping to empower the vic­
tim. “Discipline,” then, according to Foucault (1979), 
may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type 
of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, 
techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a “physics” or an 
“anatomy” of power, a technology. (p. 215) 
Those technologies of power, those negotiations and dynamics, those strate­
gies and tactics, are what we identify in our observations and interviews and 
believe that students and scholars of business and technical communication 
must understand in public settings. These interviews and observations were 
vital in helping us discern the nuances of the dynamics between the various 
groups involved in writing and interpreting VISs, and we feel strongly that 
methods in business and technical communication should include inter­
viewing and observing individuals and constituencies as they interpret 
these texts. 
Technologies of Power in the
 
Judiciary and Advocate Realms
 
The judicial discourse we captured, through interviews and observa­
tions, often contains assertions of the judges’ authority backed by the prin­
ciples of the law. Judicial choices in sentencing may also be articulated as 
limited by sentencing guidelines—a “rhetoric of inevitability,” as Bandes 
(1996) called it (p. 378; see also, Lutz, 1988). This authority and rhetoric 
of inevitability in fact work together to deflect arguments against a sen­
tencing decision and establish norms for what counts as a persuasive VIS. 
In addition, the plea negotiation and the presentencing investigation, as 
authoritative knowledge systems in a case, along with the sentencing guide­
lines then have the potential to cast any impact statement as unnecessary in 
terms of sentencing decisions. Although victim advocates are aware that 
judges generally place less emphasis on the impact statement than on other 
factors, the judges have a norm in mind for what counts as the acceptable 
VIS. Although the majority of victim advocates note that “very rarely does 
an impact statement affect the sentence because its typically been decided 
already” (AHS5), they also acknowledge the huge benefit of the statement 
for the victim. Advocates will let victims know that, in general, the purpose 
of the impact statement is not necessarily to influence the sentence; rather, 
“The power really is just in the victim being able to stand up and say, ‘You 
did this to me, it was wrong, this is how it affected me, and this is what I 
think should happen to you for doing that to me’” (AHS12). At the same 
time, as we describe later, advocates also understand the features that make 
a VIS persuasive in the eyes of the court, and they will do everything in 
their power to help victims craft such a persuasive statement. If the VIS is 
deemed persuasive by the judge, then it has a chance to function as doubly 
powerful, both as a means for catharsis for the victim and also as a tool for 
influencing the sentence. 
In our interviews, then, we encountered judges who asserted their authority 
in sentencing decisions, often to explain the reason for the sentence or its 
terms and to show that the VIS did not play a primary role in their decision 
making. One judge, for example, said, “And I want that clear to the victims 
as well as the defendant. But your input is welcome, but the decision 
remains with the court” (2JD4). This decision-making status as conveyed to 
the victim is also made clear to the defendant—and many judges, as they 
deliver the terms of the sentence, will choose to echo back to the defendant 
the contents of an impact statement in order to “give that voice from a position 
of authority” (4JD7). For example, one judge told the defendant the 
following: 
If you don’t do the things I am telling you to do, whether it’s a treatment 
program or no contact or whatever . . . I am going to put you in jail, you are 
not going to have work release, and you are going to sit there and do every 
day that I can make you do. (4JD17) 
The foundation of this status rests, many judges assert, within the principles 
of the law, which they summarize in a way that may seem dismissive of the 
victim’s individual perspective: “An individual does not get to dispense indi­
vidual justice. It’s got to fit within the scheme of what is acceptable in the 
community” (4JD18). Here, to borrow from De Certeau’s model (1984), we 
may see how the court system functions as willful and powerful, as an insti­
tution that can “serve as the base from which” those cast in the role of other 
“can be managed” (p. 36). The state, not the individual, is the victim; the 
crime is against society, and retribution rather than retaliation is the goal of 
justice. And so the victims and their advocates enter a courtroom in which the 
judges might assume a position of authority, based on their understanding of 
the function of the law, and the impact statement is clearly secondary: “I listen 
to all this and I am polite to people because the statute obligates me to, but, 
so far as I know, it doesn’t influence me” (4JD21). 
Again, in addition to this assertion of authority, judges describe sentencing 
guidelines as placing reasonable limits on that authority, as providing an 
objective and equitable framework for their decision making. As one judge 
said, “You can really have the empathy; you can feel the pain. But again, 
our justice system with the sentencing guidelines really does take out your 
visceral reactions to things” (2JD1). Another judge said the following: 
I am a great believer in them [guidelines]. They are supposed to limit dispar­
ity; they are supposed to promote proportionality, and I think they do. God 
only knows where we would all go without them. So they give me a starting 
point. (4JD6) 
These judges seem to view the guidelines as a sort of overarching strategy for 
decision making—one that delimits the territory in which action is possi­
ble (De Certeau, 1984, p. 36). 
Many of the judges we interviewed and observed also attributed their ulti­
mate sentencing decision for the crime to the plea agreement or the prosecutor’s 
decision to offer a settlement, another way in which the rhetoric of inevitability 
is used to justify a sentence decision or plea. “The prosecutor knows the 
case so much better than the judge ever does,” said one judge (2JD1). 
Therefore, judges state that they seldom “go back on the deal” (2JD5). The 
presentencing recommendation, which the judge reads before accepting the plea 
negotiation, contains information about the effect of the crime on the victim 
and the victim’s response to the plea, but that information is recorded and 
perhaps interpreted by the probation officer. So, as one judge said, “when 
you get to the impact statements, even the ones that are particularly moving 
and heartfelt and emotional, they aren’t really telling a judge anything he 
didn’t know or already assume” (4JD14). Judicial discourse about impact 
statements, then, reinforces the power and knowledge system of the law. 
Once having established this authority and suggested this inevitability, 
however, some judges do view disciplinary action as a negotiation involving 
a constellation of variables, some of which may include the impact statement 
and some of which may include additional details about the case, the victim, 
or the defendant. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances do allow a judge 
to depart from sentencing guidelines. The defendant’s past history, age and 
mental health, patterns of abuse, and possible rehabilitation, as well as the 
nature of the offense and the brutality of the crime, are all possible circumstances 
that affect the disposition (jail or probation) and duration of the sentence, and 
many defendants do waive their Blakely rights in plea negotiations in order 
to avoid possibly receiving even more severe penalties after a trial. When 
probed, then, most judges did recall at least one case in which the VIS 
caused them to reconsider a sentencing decision or plea, agreeing that there 
are certainly instances in which the impact statement can influence the 
sentence. Moreover, judges almost always acknowledged the potential 
emotional benefit of an impact statement to victims: “It gives them an 
opportunity to say, ‘You know, here’s something bad that happened to me,’ 
and it somehow has a cleansing effect on them” (2JD2). Although the victim 
must address the judge, not the defendant, when delivering a statement, the 
impact statement does give the victim a chance to tell the person, albeit 
indirectly, “You hurt me, and I feel bad. And I want you to understand that 
I am hurting” (2JD6). 
Advocates, too, while acknowledging the limited influence of the impact 
statement, often returned to the idea of the impact statement as a liberating 
tool for empowerment and validation. Many advocates felt that it really 
depends on the judge—that some judges “really try to take into consideration 
what the victim is saying” (ARC9). Interestingly, one advocate even described 
a case in which the impact letter deviated from the norm in that it was about 
10 pages long, which is not traditional. The judge “took a recess from the 
hearing to go back and read all 10 pages,” and then she “came back out on the 
record and she kicked the plea deal because based on everything the victim 
was telling her in the impact statement, she didn’t feel that she could support 
the plea negotiation” (AHS8). That example of an impact statement that 
deviated from its generic norm in a way that influenced the judge’s decision 
shows that impact statements can occasionally influence the sentence. But 
as this advocate put it, “That is the .01%” (AHS8). Notably, this advocate felt 
that the impact statement, being 10 pages long, did not fit the “traditional” 
model of the genre. Perhaps advocates’ understanding of the normative 
structures that govern what counts as an influential impact statement actually 
allowed such a nontraditional VIS to function persuasively. In other words, 
in understanding the norm, advocates may be able to subtly subvert the 
norm in order to help make the victim’s voice heard. Although we can only 
speculate on the precise features that made this particular 10-page impact 
statement persuasive to the judge, we can safely presume that victim advocates’ 
awareness of and ability to work within and against the strategies of the 
court system aided in making that “.01%” an actuality. 
Features of a Persuasive Impact Statement 
In our interviews, judges generally identified features that might make 
impact statements persuasive regardless of how objective and limited these 
judges were in making their sentencing decisions. An impact statement can 
cause a judge to rethink a plea: 
I have had cases where I was planning to honor a plea agreement, and then 
after victim impact, I rejected it. That is not typical; it’s unusual, but it has 
happened. And I actually changed my practice after that, and I told people 
whether I accept a plea agreement depends on the entire process, including 
the victim impact statement. (4JD22) 
More commonly, however, an impact statement might affect the conditions of 
probation, causing the judge to order anger-management treatment, drug 
and alcohol supervision, domestic violence counseling, or such. Moreover, 
although the advocates generally agreed that the impact statement is 
unlikely to have a real “impact on the judge in terms of sentencing,” they 
clearly agreed that the work of the impact statement transcends the actual 
sentencing. By giving an impact statement, one advocate said, “You will be 
giving a gift to society because you are educating every single person in that 
courtroom—the court reporter, the clerk, the total strangers, the judge, the 
defense attorney, the prosecutors.” That is, after hearing the impact state­
ment, they are no longer going to view the victim as “a case, they are going 
to see a human being. They are going to go, ‘Wow, I cannot imagine what 
that would be like if it happened to me’” (ARC17). Therefore, in our inter­
views and observations, we attempted to capture those traits of a persuasive 
impact statement. 
Interestingly, for judges, VISs are deemed persuasive if they argue for 
leniency or mercy, provide new information on a case, support the principles 
of the law, display insight into the crime or relationship with the defendant, 
or offer a vivid account of the crime that distinguishes it from the typical or 
average crime of its sort. One judge, for example, described the sort of 
novel point of view that a victim might offer in an impact statement: “I learn 
of the victim’s injury and impact in . . . several dimensions that have never 
been flashed before my brain before, and I will reject negotiations on those 
cases” (4JD6). Likewise, victim advocates understand that a persuasive 
impact statement should provide insights into the relationship and the crime 
that would otherwise be unavailable to the court: 
We don’t want them to get a whole lot into the incident . . . that’s already 
been established. But maybe where they were, the hopes, the dreams they had 
for this relationship [in a domestic assault case], how it started out and maybe 
how did it get this way, how it has affected them, maybe what they have been 
reduced to because of this. (AHC14) 
The most persuasive impact statements seem to be those in which the vic­
tim describes relationship dynamics, in domestic assault cases, and personal 
accounts, in other crimes, that the judge would otherwise be unable to see 
or understand. 
Consistent with this idea were the words of one judge, who noted how 
other victims were able to make their “particular case different” by describing 
details that would otherwise have remained unknown; for example, “‘I have 
had to do therapy,’ or ‘I broke my engagement,’ or ‘my husband couldn’t 
deal with me being raped, and we are divorced’” (4JD10). Another judge 
described why he imposed a more lenient sentence on a father who, while 
on drugs, threw his child against the wall to stop the child from crying. In 
this case, the mother asked for treatment rather than jail time: “She really 
loved him, and I think that she was pregnant with another child, that she 
would suffer, and the new child would suffer without having a father, that 
he was exceedingly remorseful over what happened” (4JD16). One judge, 
however, described how appreciative judges are when victims agree with 
the sentence through their insight into the ways the court must protect 
public safety: 
I just think we probably are all a little more comfortable if we hear the victim 
say, “This was awful, terrible, and yet I know that society would be better off 
. . . if this guy gets treatment as opposed to getting prison.” (4JD10) 
In such cases, the VIS confirms the court’s decision rather than influ­
ences it. 
As we discovered in our interviews, then, victims who are successful in 
influencing a sentencing decision or affecting a plea negotiation have to be 
skillful rhetors and work within the norms for VISs that are informally estab­
lished by the courts: They must argue that the crime had affected them more 
than the “typical” crime would have, that they have special insight into the 
defendant, or that they understand that a plea may be accepted that involves 
probation instead of prison time but that probation conditions might be a 
better way to correct or monitor the defendant’s behavior. In their expecta­
tions for the VIS, then, judges shape what counts as an acceptable and thereby 
persuasive VIS. But also, by understanding and working within these norms, 
victim advocates perpetuate and sustain the norm while they use that under­
standing to help victims write the most persuasive VIS possible. 
Nonetheless, delivering an impact statement is a difficult task because, 
on one hand, as many advocates agreed, “the ones that are probably the most 
compelling and the most powerful are the ones where people are really 
willing to open up and really talk about their pain” (AHS12). On the other 
hand, though, most advocates agreed that “the more sensible you come 
across, the more seriously you are taken” (AHS1). The standard for the 
well-received impact statement is therefore high. Advocates and victims 
alike have the difficult job of achieving what may seem like an impossible 
balance. That is, judges seem to want personal information and insights 
about the relationship conveyed in the impact statement, but this informa­
tion must be presented in a balanced tone that is not overly emotional. 
Advocates then recognize that for a judge to view an impact statement 
as credible, it must achieve a delicate balance between emotion and more 
objective insights into the crime. Because that is often easier said than done, 
advocates will work closely with victims, providing templates and models 
of VISs, to construct a statement that the victim feels comfortable with and 
that the advocate feels will be well received by the court. Here, advocates 
function as the other and “play on and with a terrain imposed upon [them]” 
by the authority of the court system (De Certeau, 1984, p. 36). They exercise 
tactics that work within and against the normative structures established by 
the courts. One advocate saw the need for a persuasive VIS as also rooted 
in the need to protect the genre and its ability to help future victims: 
There are things they can say in their impact statements but there are certainly 
things they cannot say in their impact statements too. The court is pretty clear 
on that, and we try to educate them so that they are not doing something that 
they are not going to be allowed to do or that could endanger possible future 
victim impact statements. (AHS6) 
The impact statement, then, not only functions as an advocacy tool but also 
as a technology of power in its own right—one that works with and against the 
system to assert and retain its disciplinary authority through its proper adher­
ence to and subtle subversion of the normative structure of the VIS. 
Another advocate acknowledged the need to keep the tone of the statement 
balanced—again, working within the system while also integrating the 
victim’s voice in a manner acceptable to the judge: 
I let them know, “I want you to be as open and honest as you are willing to 
be.” . . . “You are welcome to talk about him but the comments have to be 
directed to the court,” and then [there are] guidelines about being respectful 
too. (AHS12) 
Advocates noted that victims’ requests for sentencing should “be reason­
able” and that when reading the impact statement, it’s “okay to cry, and it’s 
okay to be emotional, but you don’t want to yell. You don’t want to talk in 
half sentences” (AHS1). Advocates also noted that impact statements tend 
to work best when they are written or prepared ahead of time. Impact state­
ments, then, must be carefully crafted, respectful, and articulate. The need 
to work within these expectations is important not only to ensure that the 
victim is heard but also to retain the disciplinary authority of the VIS as a 
viable knowledge system, as a technology of power that helps negotiate the 
balance between the victim’s need to be heard and the judge’s need to retain 
authority and work within the normative structures of the court—structures 
that the judges themselves perpetuate and sustain. 
Judicial Demeanor in the Courtroom 
During the sentencing hearing itself, judges struggle with how to respond 
to VISs. Advocates, having witnessed a wide range of judicial demeanor in 
the courtroom, understand and corroborate this point. Within the hearings 
we observed and in the recollections of hearings conveyed in interviews, we 
found that negotiations were again at play in the courtroom when VISs 
were presented. 
Most judges confirm that they offer victims at least nonverbal assurances 
that they are listening to them, and some go beyond those assurances to 
incorporate the VIS in the imposition of the sentence. As one judge said, “I 
look them in the eye. I don’t write notes. I try to show that I am interested, 
and I want to accommodate them, and I am listening to what they say” (4JD16). 
Moreover, during a February 2005 criminal sexual assault hearing, we 
observed the judge tell the victim that she was a brave, good person and that 
she did the right thing.5 Consistent with this point, most advocates cited 
making eye contact, displaying active listening, and providing validating 
comments as among the best things a judge can do to make the victim feel 
heard. As one advocate put it: 
I love the eye contact, and the victim might not even be aware of it because 
she is shaking, holding her paper, trying to read. . . . Certainly when they 
[judges] say things like, “I just want to thank you for your courage. I know 
that was hard for you,” I just think that’s huge in helping her heal from it all. 
(AHS3) 
What can be most validating, though, as another advocate explained, is 
when the judge will say things to the defendant that the victim would like 
to be able to say herself: 
Judges have a lot to say at sentencing hearings to the defendant, and depend­
ing on how moved they have been by what this person did, sometimes they 
say what the victim would like to say themselves but can’t. Things like, “. . . 
I can’t believe how much damage you have caused here.” (ARS16) 
An advocate said, for example, that a victim once told her that the judge’s 
words, in acknowledging her statement, were “balm for her soul” (ARS16). 
This impression was confirmed in more than one sentencing hearing. In one 
 hearing, for example, the victim’s brother, for whom English was a second 
language, struggled to express his loss. The judge confirmed that his state­
ment was heard by saying that she was “aware of how wonderful his sister 
was and how much she had cared for her friends and family” (May 10, 
2005). Another judge, who addressed a 9-year-old victim of sexual assault 
whose teacher described in an impact statement that the young victim had 
lost her confidence, was well aware that he could use his status to try to 
restore that confidence: “So I used my power and my pulpit to say, ‘You are 
a courageous young woman, and you are a strong young woman, and I 
want you to know this is not your fault’” (4JD22). He ordered the defen­
dant to pay restitution for the victim’s counseling for the rest of her life. But 
these comments are still considered crossing the line for many judges. 
So, judges may choose to remain silent because they feel ill-equipped to 
know what to say to victims: “I have trouble with that. I often times don’t 
know what to say” (4JD1). This response is a survival tactic for some; for 
instance, one judge said, “I think I am able to put things behind me in order 
to just keep living. I seem to be able to finish something and be done with it 
and not have it haunt me too long” (4JD2). This detachment, of course, does 
not go unnoticed by others in the courtroom. One victim advocate, for 
example, stated that during particularly emotional impact statements, judges 
“either get pulled in or they are pushed away” (AHC14); they succumb to the 
expressions of pain and grief, or they work twice as hard to resist them 
(AHC14). Advocates’ awareness and understanding of the dynamics of 
judicial demeanor and the attitudes and beliefs that influence it serve as an 
additional variable that informs their understanding of the role of impact 
statements. As another advocate put it, “There are a lot of judges who, you 
know, survive this work by building this wall, and they don’t really want to 
be moved. They see it as having a bias” (ARC17). Although advocates 
frequently concede that judges play a difficult role in the process, they are not 
necessarily expressing opposition to judges’ demeanor when they make com­
ments such as that one. Rather, they are acknowledging the various perspec­
tives and often-difficult positions of judges. Advocates then use their prior 
knowledge of judicial demeanor in the courtroom as yet another means to 
strengthen their own work and, ultimately, help empower the victim. 
Many judges, however, are hesitant to respond verbally to an impact 
statement not because they have built a wall, per se, but because they fear that 
such a response may diminish their authority or control of their courtrooms. 
One judge, for example, said he doesn’t respond verbally to the victim’s 
statement “because I have to stay objective, and the way I show my objec­
tivity is by not taking sides” (2JD2). Another judge stated that she refrains 
from commenting because she cannot control the victim’s reactions to her 
comments: 
I just listen. Usually I don’t say too much because you just really never know 
what to say because whatever you say could be taken wrong, and I don’t want 
anyone to think that I am judging what they say or demeaning them. (4JD14) 
One judge explained that he has to distinguish carefully between his own 
emotional response and his legal discourse, as he described one comment 
he made in a homicide case: 
“One of the things that happens in our lives is that our parents die . . . that’s 
the natural order of things. But there is no consolation of a parent losing a 
child. Your last thought before you die . . . will be of this child and what hap­
pened to it. . . .” So I have all sorts of consolatory speeches in my repertoire, 
but none of it has anything to do with the criminal law. (4JD21) 
Finally, this distinction between legal and emotional discourse led a judge 
to suppress his response to victims: 
I think that the informal training we get with the victim impact statements is 
that judges don’t really comment on the victim impact statement, and that can 
be very difficult because . . . it just seems like common decency to express 
your sorrow and condolence. (4JD2) 
In other cases, however, judges were simply not able to maintain this 
resolve. In one hearing, for example, four family members gave impact 
statements in which they described their loss when a young relative had 
been killed in a driving while intoxicated case. She had always wanted to 
get married and had overcome physical and mental challenges in order to 
be able to do so, but then on her first wedding anniversary, she was killed 
by a driver impaired by drugs. The court clerk, the prosecutor, the defen­
dant, and the judge all cried during the hearing (April 15, 2006). 
Judges, then, struggle to find a response to impact statements that fits 
their own sense of appropriate legal discourse, control, authority, and 
human decency. And as advocates noted, victims for whom catharsis rests 
on the judge’s ability to express emotion may be most disappointed during 
sentencing hearings conducted by judges who feel that emotion and reason 
are separate entities, who feel compelled to suppress their own emotional 
responses, or who have become numb to impact statements in general. One 
advocate told how this lack of emotional response complicates her ability 
to assist the victim: 
I tried to prepare the client . . . they are crying and emotional, and the people 
with them are crying and emotional, and then to see this judge just kind of like 
sitting there, I think that this is really hard for them to deal with. (AHC10) 
Finally, in some cases we observed that the judge maintained a formal 
and objective persona during the hearing but communicated informally and 
even emotionally after the hearing. During a hearing in a third-degree crim­
inal sexual conduct case, for example, the victim conveyed in her impact 
statement a sense of her trauma and survival in saying to other potential vic­
tims, “Don’t be afraid when something like this happens,” but be strong and 
courageous (April 25, 2006). She described how her life had gotten better, and 
she thanked the police officer that had helped her at the time of the incident. 
After the hearing, the judge walked out into the gallery to speak to the victim, 
whom he recognized from her own appearances in drug court, and praised 
her for how far she had come. Another judge followed the mother of a vic­
tim into the hallway after a hearing. In her impact statement, the mother had 
described the severity of the attacks on her daughter. The defendant had 
attacked the daughter five times before, and, according to the complaint, in 
this latest attack, he had broken out the victim’s teeth and battered her beyond 
recognition. The mother described how she feared for her daughter’s life 
because the daughter was drug and alcohol addicted and unable to leave the 
relationship (March 31, 2006). The judge, who had maintained the order for 
protection but, despite having imposed a sentence that was more severe than 
the guidelines suggested, could impose only 180 days in the workhouse, 
offered to help the victim’s mother protect her daughter in “any way” she 
could, and she praised her for preparing the impact statement. “It took a lot of 
courage,” the judge said, as she asked whether she could share the statement 
with others for “educational” purposes. Again, these last two judges main­
tained the formality of the hearing but physically moved away from the 
bench and engaged in personal conversations to acknowledge the courage 
and the fears of the victims. Moments such as this demonstrate how the VIS 
can function as a persuasive tool that can help negotiate the power rela­
tionships in the courtroom. Although these power dynamics may appear 
strictly hierarchical at times, they really are not. The VIS functions as a 
technology of power that negotiates disciplinary norms. When composed with 
an underlying knowledge of the normative structures governing the persua­
sive impact statement, the VIS becomes a disciplinary tool whose role is to 
highlight the parameters within which the norms can be defined and then 
perhaps subtly subverted. 
Conclusion
 
Judges understand and respect that victims have the legislated right to 
give an impact statement, and they certainly honor that right; however, they 
also struggle to maintain not only their authority in the courtroom but also 
their role within a larger institution that, to borrow from De Certeau’s 
(1984) language, serves as a base from which external threats may be man­
aged. The unpredictability of the emotional displays elicited by impact 
statements is sometimes perceived as a threat to that authority and to that 
institution. Judges then use the rhetoric of inevitability, citing sentencing 
guidelines as being more restrictive than they actually might be in individ­
ual cases, to give them the option to offset that threat. Victims, on the other 
hand, see the impact statement as an opportunity to make themselves heard, 
request particular sentences or punishments, and gain closure on the crime. 
Victim advocates must negotiate the relationships between judges and 
victims, not only by understanding judges’ preferences and comfort levels 
with VISs but also by being honest with victims about the limitations of the 
VIS and the potential emotional value for the victim. In negotiating these 
relationships, they ease the tension between these two groups by helping 
victims to adjust their expectations as well as to compose the most appro­
priate statement, given the normative structures governing it and the room 
for subtle subversion that such normative structures allow for and invite. 
Inherent in each group’s interpretation of the right to give an impact 
statement are the values and goals both of a system that seeks to highlight 
the parameters within which the norms may be defined in relation to the 
person or group cast as the other and of that other itself. Again, by refer­
ring to a system that seeks to enforce parameters, we do not mean to say 
that the relationship between judges and victims is necessarily adversarial 
or even strictly hierarchical. Indeed, victim advocates have a lot of knowl­
edge to impart to members of the court system, and judges do understand 
that advocates have much to offer in the way of experience and resources. 
The middle ground, therefore, lies in the negotiation afforded by the work 
of the VIS itself and by those moments of mutual understanding that occur 
when judges are moved by an impact statement or when judges listen 
attentively, validate, and even express sympathy to the victim. The disci­
plinary power of each group then fluctuates given a constellation of vari­
ables. Thus, these relationships are far from being strictly hierarchical 
although they may appear so. Although advocates must play on the terrain 
imposed on them, they are able to control this terrain as well, and by using 
the technologies of power afforded by the VIS to work within and against 
the system, they use their discursive understanding to help empower the 
victim. 
Such studies as this one provide insight into important questions about 
business and technical communication in the public arena. Concerned groups 
must negotiate public policy, including interpretations of legislated rights and 
limitations, to articulate and achieve their goals. Understanding how those 
groups frame problems, define rhetorical exigencies, and get issues on the 
table demands in-depth and often sustained investigation—investigation that 
goes much beyond identifying various voices and articulated goals. The inter­
action between these concerned groups, as we discovered, may take place in 
a middle ground of negotiation, which is not immediately obvious to the 
investigator. And as we experienced, one way for scholars of business and 
technical communication and rhetoric to conduct such cases is to partner with 
a community group involved in such negotiations. That community partner, 
in turn, can help more widely disseminate the results and recommendations 
of such studies so that research participants can increase their understanding 
of each other and open up the dialogue. In our case, we also hope that our 
study will reveal to advocates and victims successfully persuasive strategies 
and tactics that enhance a VIS. 
Finally, we have some suggestions for how graduate education, in par­
ticular, in business and technical communication, might address the themes 
and discoveries we found in our study: 
1. 	 We are long accustomed to audience analysis techniques that enforce hierar­
chical descriptions, particularly within industry—someone is the boss, some­
one a colleague, someone an employee. In our study, we found that victims 
and their advocates were able to enter into negotiations with judges who ini­
tially seemed to have much uniform authority and status. The legislated right 
to give a VIS began that negotiation, but working within the norm also pro­
vided a way not only to negotiate but also to resist the blanket imposition of 
judicial authority or sentencing guidelines. Our graduate courses then need to 
address those more nuanced relationships within the public arena. 
2.	 Not only do graduate courses need to address those more nuanced relation­
ships within the public arena, but they should also subsequently encourage 
firsthand experiences within those arenas whenever possible. By encouraging 
partnerships with organizations that deal with various forms of public policy, 
whether it be in the legal or nonprofit arena, for example, students get to wit­
ness policy in action versus or in addition to policy analyzed in the text. 
3.	 We recommend that graduate students have the opportunity to experience the 
application of theory as interpretive tools. Students often feel they must extend 
theory to succeed in their courses or dissertations, but the case study approach, 
such as ours, for example, demands that theory provide tools first to interpret 
and then to contribute to theory. By starting with such unique case studies, we 
can begin to understand the rhetorical nature of the public arena and the nego­
tiations within the creation and application of public policy. 
4.	 Business and technical communication provides tools for understanding the 
persuasive elements of genres as they are applied in decision making and in 
creating new documents, such as the legislated right to give a VIS and the 
statement itself in negotiation with sentencing guidelines. These tools pro­
vide an understanding of the relationship of text and its presentation, in this 
case, in the courtroom. Moreover, expertise in business and technical com­
munication should include the ability to interview and observe individuals 
and constituencies as they interpret these texts. 
5.	 Finally, sharing the results of our study with WATCH was one of the most 
rewarding aspects of our project. Sharing research results with participants 
and inviting their participation or feedback is also an important component 
of activist research, as Barton (2004), Faber (1998), Grabill (2000), Schuster 
(2006), and Waddell (1996) all explicitly or implicitly described. With this, 
we feel that graduate courses in the research methods of business and tech­
nical communication would benefit by addressing the complexities of shar­
ing research results with research participants or the public. 
Appendix A 
Sample Interview Questions for Judges and for Advocates 
Judges: 
1.	 How long have you been a judge in Hennepin/Ramsey County? 
2.	 How often do you see a victim impact statement (VIS) submitted to you 
before a sentencing hearing? How often does the victim give allocution of 
that statement at the hearing? 
3.	 What factors do you commonly weigh before deciding on a sentence? 
4.	 How important is the existence of a VIS in the context of all the other fac­
tors that influence your decision? Which is the most important factor in 
deciding on a sentence? 
5.	 Do you give more weight to a victim who gives allocution of that VIS at the 
hearing itself? Or does it matter? 
6.	 In considering a VIS, do you consider separately the victim’s statement of 
the emotional impact of the crime and the victim’s opinion of the kind and 
degree of sentence that the defendant should receive? If you do consider sep­
arately the victim’s statement of the emotional impact of the crime and the 
victim’s opinion of the kind and degree of sentence that the defendant 
should receive, which carries more weight with you? The emotional appeal 





7.	 Are there universal standards or professional guidelines that help you deter­
mine how much weight to give the VIS? Over time, have you developed 
your own standards or guidelines that help you determine how much weight 
to give the VIS? And would you share those with me? 
8.	 Could you recall for me a VIS that made a particular impression on you? 
And why? 
9.	 Is there anything else that you would like to share with me about the felony/ 
gross misdemeanor domestic violence courtroom, the sentencing decisions 
that you must make, and/or VISs? 
Advocates: 
1.	 Could you describe how you have worked with victims in the past to develop 
VISs? What tools and guidelines do you provide them? 
2.	 Generally how have you observed that victim input is gathered by your 
office or organization, by the prosecutor’s office, or by probation? 
3.	 What do you think motivates victims to submit a VIS? What might make 
them reluctant? Who do you think that a victim who writes an impact state­
ment perceives the audience to be? 
4.	 Do you think that it is more important for the victim to express the emo­
tional impact of the crime or to express an opinion as to the kind and degree 
of the sentence? Or both? Generally which of these two purposes are victims 
more successful in accomplishing? 
5.	 How often do victims elect not only to write an impact statement but also 
to attend and speak at the sentencing hearing? Do you think that it’s 
important for a victim to attend the sentencing hearing—and do you urge 
them to do so? 
6.	 In your experience, if a victim elects not to attend a hearing and to give allo­
cution, why does the victim choose not to do so? 
7.	 How much weight do you think judges give to VISs? In terms of the other 
factors that the judge must weigh in determining a sentence, which factor do 
you think is most important? 
8.	 In your opinion, what features must a persuasive VIS have? Could you share 
with me the description of any VIS that you think had a particular impact on 
the judge—in terms of expressing the emotional impact of the crime or in 
influencing the kind and degree of sentence or both? 
9.	 Is there anything else you would like to share with me in terms of your expe­
rience in working with victims in general? Or in submitting VISs? Or in giv­





Your Name: Date: 
Case Number: Judge: 
Offense: Advocate: 
Defendant: Relationship to Victim: 
Sentence: 
I.	 How was the VIS presented in court (circle all that apply)? 
a. Read by the victim or family member in the hearing 
b. Read by the county attorney/prosecutor in hearing 
c. Read by advocate in hearing 
d. Submitted in writing before the hearing 
e. Other ____________________ 
II.	 Was it your impression that the VIS was offered to (circle all that apply) 
a. argue for a particular sentence or treatment plan 
b. bring closure to the emotional effect of the crime on the victim 
c. give the victim a sense that justice is being done 
d. other____________________________________ 
III.	 Summarize the content of the VIS, if it was read or described during the hearing. 
Be sure to include any specific requests made by the victim. 
IV.	 How would you describe the demeanor of the judge in listening to and 
responding to the VIS? 
a. supportive (e.g., welcoming, agreeing) 
b. courteous (e.g., attentive, interested) 
c. businesslike (e.g., routine, impersonal) 
d. strict (e.g., bureaucratic, firm, stress power of the judge) 
e. condescending (e.g., patronizing, demeaning, sexist) 
f. harsh (e.g., nasty, abrasive, scolding, contemptuous) 
g. other: 
V.	 What verbal statements did the judge make toward the victim or the person 
reading the impact statement that might contribute to your descriptions of judi­
cial demeanor? For example, did the judge engage in dialogue with the victim, 
thank the victim, respond to any specifics of the impact statement, mention 
specifics of the impact statement to the defendant? Please describe: 
VI.	 What nonverbal gestures did the judge make toward the victim or the person 
reading the impact statement that might contribute to your descriptions of judi­
cial demeanor? For example, facial expressions (maintains eye contact, smiles, 
frowns), posture (faces victim, sits at attention), mannerisms (nods head, looks 





VII. Did the judge acknowledge that the VIS affected his or her decision in the sen­





Please summarize what the judge said, particularly about how the sentence 
might have been affected by the VIS: 
VIII. Describe anything that the defendant or the defense attorney said on the 
defendant’s behalf (particularly in response to the impact statement): 
IX.	 Describe any reaction to the impact statement from the gallery or anything the 
judge did to maintain control of the courtroom during the sentencing: 
X.	 Record below any other impression that you think might be important: 
Notes 
1. Results of this study were presented at the Law and Society Association Conference in 
Baltimore, MD, in July 2006 and at the College Composition and Communication Conference 
in New York City in March 2007. 
2. We identify the speaker of a quote according to the following key: If the speaker is a 
judge, we identify the district, either the second judicial district (2JD) or the fourth judicial 
district (4JD), and the random number we assigned that judge (in this case, number 6). If the 
speaker is an advocate (A), we identify the county, either Hennepin (H) or Ramsey (R); the 
type, either system (S) or community (C); and the random number we assigned that advocate. 
3. WATCH volunteers used our observation form to record their impressions of impact 
statements given during sentencing hearings. But because we were not able to control for the 
volunteers’ varying degrees of experience (e.g., observers’ experience ranged from that of new 
student interns to that of the executive director of WATCH), we have grounded our findings on 
our interviews and our own observations. 
4. The Minnesota sentencing guidelines grid can be found at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/. 
5. Statements and observations from the hearings are noted by the date alone. 
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